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With the arrival and subsequent repercussions of the 1987 worldwide 
sharemarket crash, the instances of businesses and individuals alike facing 
insolvency in New Zealand has escalated at an unprecedented rate. A large 
number of these insolvencies ultimately resulted in bankruptcy for 
individuals under the Insolvency Act 1967. Accompanying the growth in 
bankruptcies was a desire to avoid the restrictions and utilise alternatives 
to satisfy the demands of creditors. One such alternative is a proposal 
under Part XV of the Insolvency Act or an arrangement under Part X of 
the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (C'th). Utilisation of proposals as an alternative 
to bankruptcy has mirrored the growth in insolvencies in New Zealand if 
the number of judicial decisions is taken as the measure. 
This article investigates and critically evaluates proposals filed under 
Part XV of the Insolvency Act 1967. Proposals were first introduced with 
the 1967 consolidation and amendment to the Insolvency Act 1956. Part 
XV of the Insolvency Act provides the procedure for securing creditor 
acceptance and gaining court approval of a proposal. Essentially a proposal 
is a document filed by an insolvent person (one unable to pay their debts 
as they fall due) as an alternative to bankruptcy proceedings being taken 
against them. The proposal sets out the manner in which debts will be 
paid or satisfied (s 140). The insolvent person, in making the proposal to 
his or her creditors, details the assets and liabilities and proposed debt 
repayment terms, and files a copy of this in the appropriate High Court 
Registry. Having signed the proposal the insolvent must obtain the 
endorsement of a trustee to act on his or her behalf. This person becomes 
the Provisional Trustee and must carry out the duties ofthis position as set 
out in s 141. Of fundamental importance is the calling of the meeting of 
creditors, and determining their votes on the proposal as presented or 
modified by resolution. This vote requires both a majority in number of 
creditors and 75 percent in value of those who vote to accept the proposal. 
If acceptance is forthcoming the trustee applies for court approval of the 
proposal (s 142). 
Finally, for the proposal to be effective, it must be approved by the 
courts and then the insolvent must fulfil the provisions of the proposal (s 
143). The court is required to hear any objection to the proposal by any of 
the creditors as set out in s 143(1) and (2). The court then plays a pivotal 
role in determining whether the proposal will be given legal effect. The 
court may refuse to approve the proposal on three major grounds and 
must refuse to give approval on a fourth ground. The court may refuse 
approval if the provisions of Part XV have not been complied with, or the 
terms of the proposal are not reasonable or not calculated for the general 
benefit of creditors, or for any reason it is ofthe view that it is not expedient 
* My thanks to John Walsh for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper 
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that the proposal should be approved. The court may not approve a proposal 
if it does not provide for the payments in priority as for the distribution of 
the property of a bankrupt and the trustee's proper fees and expenses. 
Once approved, the proposal is binding on all creditors and the insolvent 
has avoided the need for adjudication in bankruptcy (s 144). 
After approval a proposal may be varied or cancelled by application to 
the court (s 145). The legislative requirements are essentially the same as 
in Part X of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (C'th), although this statute contains 
more detailed and specific provisions than the Insolvency Act.' 
Why are proposals important? The major reason for the legislative 
provision of proposals was outlined succinctly by Barker J in Re Fal~oner :~  
I am of the view that the dominant purpose of the legislation is to provide the opportunity 
for a person in financial difficulties to make proposals to his creditors which, if they accept, 
will give him a chance to trade his way out of financial difficulty without the stigma of 
bankruptcy. 
Thus the proposal is an important consideration for the insolvent person 
if they wish to continue in business and avoid the stigma of being labelled 
a bankrupt or "financial leper". Many high profile business persons have 
been subject to bankruptcy proceeding in recent times in New Zealand, 
and with a number of insolvents successfully implementing their proposals 
where the debts are in the tens of millions of dollars, this avenue for 
"retaining commercial status" cannot be ignored. 
Obviously, any research cannot evaluate proposals that are placed before 
creditors and fail to meet with their approval, and the creditors' refusal is 
not taken to the courts for consideration. Consequently this article presents 
an analysis of proposals placed before the courts, either for approval or 
for clarification on matters of procedure. With very few court decisions 
before 1980 the period of coverage spans 1980 to 1994. Judicial decisions 
during this period are examined with respect to the content of the proposals, 
the factors that supported a successful proposal and the reasons underlying 
unsuccessful proposals. Consistency within the judicial decision-making 
is also evaluated where the contents of the judgments permit. This article 
provides guidance for intending proposal applicants in the light of important 
factors identified by the courts. 
Prior research in New Zealand has been minimal, although recently 
the exposure of Part X arrangements in Australia in the literature has 
gathered momentum. There has been one earlier study in New Zealand3 
which evaluated whether the "public interest" should be taken into account 
by the court in deciding whether or not to approve a proposal. In this 
study, Heath concluded in the following manner:4 
In my view, it is contrary to the clear words of s 143(3) and to the spirit of Part XV to 
import an overriding public interest element as a factor to consider on an application to 
approve a proposal. 
I See J Farmer, Creditor and Debtor Law in Australia and New Zealand, (3rd edn 1986), ch 14. 
2 [1981] 1 NZLR 266, at 271. 
3 P Heath, 'Proposals under the Insolvency Act: Is the public interest relevant?', (1991) NZLJ 52. 
4 Ibid 54. 
Proposing An Alternative to Bankruptcy: 
Part XV in Retrospect 
At present my views are clearly contrary to the weight o f  judicial authority. It remains to 
be seen whether, in a case in which the issue is critical, the Court will adopt the approach 
discussed in the cases I have mentioned. 
The literature retains a focus on the theoretical justification of proposals 
(or Part X arrangements), although recently there has been a detailed 
analysis of when use of the Part X arrangement may be appropriate. 
Consideration of the legislation's intentions and overall scheme and 
purpose is another vital aspect to the analysis. In this respect, Bigmore5 
outlines the statutory procedure for Part X arrangements, and the avenues 
for creditors to attack these arrangements. 
One of the areas attracting litigation in New Zealand and Australia 
involves the procedures for voting and the chairman's role in determining 
the right to vote at the meeting of creditors. Keay6 reviews the Australian 
legislation and frequently conflicting authorities, concluding that the issue 
has been clarified from an academic viewpoint but many practical issues 
remain unresolved. As will be illustrated later in the article, the New 
Zealand courts have encountered similar difficulties with proposals under 
Part XV of the Insolvency Act. 
Recently, Keay and Kennedy7 provided a succinct analysis of the issues 
for insolvency advisers to resolve when determining whether or not to 
seek bankruptcy over the alternatives. In Part One, the authors reviewed 
the options available to debtors in the Australian context; that is, evasion 
of the situation, moratorium provisions, private informal arrangements, 
bankruptcy and Part X arrangements. In Part Two, the authors reviewed 
the implications of pursuing the bankruptcy alternative, with the obligations 
on the bankrupt, and the effects on the bankrupt's family, associates, 
property and creditors. This is contrasted to the Part X arrangement, and 
the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing this alternative. The authors 
provide suggestions of the components to be included in a Part X 
arrangement placed before creditors. 
As stated by Barker J in Re Falconer, the dominant purpose for permitting 
a proposal is to allow an insolvent person to trade their way out of financial 
difficulty without the stigma of bankruptcy, subject to the procedures 
required by the legislative framework. For a proposal to have the chance 
of success there must be advantages for both the debtor and the creditors. 
The potential advantages for the debtor and creditors are summarised in 
Table 1 although these may not be present in every proposal application. 
The potential advantages suggest that in many instances, it would be in 
the interest of both the creditors and the debtor to implement a proposal, 
subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act. However, there is the 
issue of whether a third group should be considered, that is, the general 
public. Should the public interest be a factor in the determination ofwhether 
5 GT Bigmore, 'Part X Arrangements', (1992) 66 The Law Institute Journal, July 609. 
6 AR Keay, 'Can the Chairman's Decision Concerning the Right to Vote at a Part X Meeting be 
Reviewed?', (1993) 1 Insolvency Law Journal 35. 
7 AR Keay and P Kennedy, 'To Bankrupt, or Not to Bankrupt? The Question Faced by All 
Insolvency Advisers: Part One', (1993) 1 Insolvency Law Journal 187. AR Keay and P Kennedy, 
'To Bankrupt, or Not to Bankrupt? The Question Faced by All Insolvency Advisers: Part Two', 
(1994) 2 Insolvency Law Journal 13. 
8 Adapted and extended from Keay and Kennedy, Part Two, ibid. 
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a proposal should succeed? This question was considered by Heath, who 
resolved that there should be no overriding public interest factor. The issue 
arises by virtue of section 143(3)(c), which provides: 
The Court may refuse to approve the proposal if it is of the opinion - ... that for any reason 
it is not expedient that the proposal should be approved. 
Heath contends that what is expedient (that is suitable, advisable, more 
politic than just) is conceptually different to what is just and equitable. 
The courts may determine that it is more suitable for a proposal to go 
ahead on efficiency grounds, but it may be more just for bankruptcy 
proceedings to commence. Heath would permit the courts to determine 
the advisability of approving the proposal but not whether it is just and 
equitable to grant approval. Consequently, Heath's thesis is that whatever 
the court may ascertain to be in the general public's interest could not be 
used to outweigh what may be seen as advisable or suitable in the debtor's 
and creditors' interests. Subject to the provisions for presenting a proposal 
within the legislation, and that the terms of the proposal are reasonable 
and for the benefit of the general body of creditors, then whatever the 
creditors collectively and the debtor resolve to do, the court should approve 
this course of action. 
Table 1: The advantages ofproposals for debtors and creditors 
Advantages for the debtor 
Selection of the provisional trustee (~141). 
Avoiding the stigma of bankruptcy. 
Avoiding the costs of court bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
Avoiding the publicity of bankruptcy. 
Subject to the terms of the proposal, 
property acquired after proposal is 
complete and enforceable is not affected. 
Avoiding the limitations placed on a 
bankrupt, such as leaving New Zealand 
and running a business. 
Avoidingtheexaminationofabankrupt 
under s 69. 
Subject to the terms of the proposal, the 
debtor will not be required to contribute to 
his or her creditors fi-om his or her income. 
Reduced exposure to criminal liability 
Advantages for creditors 
Independent control of  the debtor's 
assets by the provisional trustee. 
Avoiding the cost of court proceedings 
under a bankruptcy. 
Earlier receipt and higher amount of 
distribution than under bankruptcy. 
Contributions from friends, relatives, 
employers, to assist in the debtor's 
avoidance of bankruptcy. 
Creditors may be able  to  continue 
trading with the debtor. 
Debtor may be able to  continue in  
business or employment to the benefit 
of creditors. 
G r e a t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  t h a n  w i t h  a 
bankruptcy administration. 
More co-operation from the debtor 
through their personal involvement in the 
proposal and in disclosing their assets. 
Finalisation of the distribution process 
may be quicker than with bankruptcy 
administration. 
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Heath posits that private arrangements subject to court approval should 
not require an assessment of whether the public is best served by the terms of 
the proposal. There is sound argument that on application of the scheme and 
purpose approach to interpreting the Insolvency Act, proposals are an alter- 
native to the "public nature" ofbankruptcy. To buttress this argument, there is 
no provision included in the statutory scheme inferring that the public interest 
can be used to usurp the wishes ofthe debtor and the general body of creditors. 
In the next section ofthis article, the proposzls m h i d l  have come Dcffirc 
the courts have raised the issue of an overriding public interest elernen:, 
which the weight of early judicial authosit)~ imposed as a gloss on the 
legislation. More recently, the Court of A,~pcaE refocussed the emphasjc; 
on the creditors' commercial appraisal of the proposal A clear statement 
on this issue by way of an additionai provision or clarification to the existinu. 
legislation would assist in resolving the debate. There are nevertheles ; 
laudable arguments to support consideration of the public interest with 
applications for approval of proposals. Otherwise debtors and creditor; 
may formulate arrangements which are mutually beneficial but fail to 
provide for any recompense to the general public which frequently ha(; 
directly or indirectly suffered from the debtor's actions. Furthermore, 
creditors with provable debts of up to 25 percent of the total value of 
provable debts may strongly disagree with the terms of the proposal yet 
have no avenue for redress - they will be bound by the proposal once it has 
been approved by the courts (s 144). 
The following schedule of cases (in judgment delivery date order) 
provides a basis for analysis of the issues in preparing a proposal and 
advancing it from creditor approval to court approval and eventual 
implementa t i~n.~~ 
continued ... 
Table 2: Schedule oJ"Proposa1 Cases under Part XV. 1980 to 1994 Inclusive 
9 See Farmer v Rowley [I9921 2 NZLR 195 (CA). 
lo Important cases appear in bold type. 
ImporCant Ohsenaim 
Discussion on s 139 
excluding partnerships, 
and lack of clarity in 
legislation. 
Public interest is 
relevant (p 9). 
I)mdum for accepting 
aeditcPs' poofs (p 616). I 
Case Name 
1. Re Falconer 
[I9811 1 NZLR266, 
Barker J. 
2. Re & c M ,  e x p t e  
Bell, unreported, &die 
Boys J, 23 
December 1980, HC, 
B2n8. 
3. Re Duncan Holdings, 
Re Bennetts, unreported 
Hardie Boys J, 1 February 
1982, HC, M3W81. 
4. Re Chad [I9851 2 I NZLR 612, Vautier J. 1 I I appl~cahons (p 614). 
U e  
Declined 
Declined 
Succesful 
Approved 
Approved 
Technidalua 
Proposal of 6 
Minor adjustment 
made to proposal 
under s 143(6). 
separate 
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Case Name Successll U- Technicalissues Impo~tOhEe~aliom 
5 Re Nicholson, Approved Minor amendment Alterations to the 
unreported, Tomkins J, 5 to proposal (p 2). insolvent's contributions 
April 1984, HC, M555183. need not be of substance 
(P 3). 
6 Ballin v Market Time should have 
Gardkners Ltd & om, been granted to 
unreported, Roper J, HC, allow for a 
22 August 1984, M284/84. P ~ O P S ~ ~  (P 3) 
7. Re Tqlor, unreported, 
Sinclair J ,  11 April 1985, 
HC, B. 136184. 
Declined Priority of payments Debtor did not appear 
incorrect (s 143(5)). (p 2). 
8 Re Lewin, unreported, Approved Approved proposal Variation permitted if 
Henry J, 3 Februiuy earlier on 4 April required b 4 ) .  Debts to 
1986, HC, A 1375184 1984 be proved as for 
bankruptcy (P 2) 
9. Re %on, unreported, Both A%davit over On overall appreciation 
Sinclair J, 25 July 1988, Approved assets and liabilities proposal was for &t 
HC, B.454188. @ 4) of the d t a s  (p 7). 
10. Re Trott, unreported, Both Joint debts, A monumental f m c i a l  
Tompkins J, 14 April Approved contingent liabilities, disaster (p 42), not 
1989, HC, B. 1471188; and expediency culpable misconduct 
Re Jov unremrted. issues disc& (D 27'1. d t o n  receive 
~ o m $ & s  J, '14 ~ $ 1  more &I d i e r .  
1989, HC, B 147Y88. 
11 Re Fidow [I9891 2 Declined Failed to satisfy Deteriorating financial 
NZLR 43 1, Fisher J. voting requirements, position (p 442). Public 
interest important (p 
444) Need for f d i t y  
@ 445). 
12. Re Kelliher, Both No misconduct and 
unremrted. W~lliamson Auoroved reasonable and ex~ed- 
. . 
J, 24 July 1989, HC, 
B. lY89. 
ient proposals (p 8) 
13. Re Nathan, Declined Proposal was No recovery of any 
unreported, Robertson J, technically correct substance (p 20). Public 
14 August 1989, HC, (P 19) entitled to protection; 
B.53189. need for deterrence (p 
21). Perceptiom created 
not to be ignored (p 22). 
14 Re Henry, ex pmte Declined Not reasonable or Level of debt 
Diners Club (NZ) Ltd, for the benefit of astronomical by NZ 
unreported, Master creditors @ 6) standards (p 6). 
Towle, 30 August 1989, 
HC, B. 1992188. 
1 5. Re Riddifom', Approved The fact the Forgiveness of debt 
unreported, N e m r  J, 2 1 proposal was not assemble inaMle (p 47). 
September 1989, HC, advertised was not Comments on why 
B.91189. fatal (p 36). approved (pp 47-51). 
16 Re Ally, unreported, Approved Debtor required to Minor amendment not 
Holland J, 16 November contribute more (p 3). of substance. 
1989, HC, B. 105189. 
17. Re Davison, Declined Voting major Expedient includes 
unreported, Holland J, creditor denied - public interest and 
13 December 1989, HC, fundamental to overall justice. Court 
B 412189. success (p 7) discretion not very 
e l m y  e m  (p 9).
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18. Smith v Taylor, 
unreported, Somers, 
Appeal 
Declined 
Hardie Boys, Heron JJ, 
13 February 1990, CA, 
CA.33190. (Appeal fiom 
case 7 above.) 
19. District Declined Unpaid GST is a 
Commissioner of lnland debt entitled to 
Revem v Bain (1990) priority (p 7,295). 
12 NZTC 7,292, 
W~lliamson J. 
No substance in 
proposal, opportunity 
for composition (p 3). 
Not relevant that the 
District Commissioner 
was better off under a 
proposal than upon 
bankruptcy (P 7,295). 
20. Re h i e s ,  
unreoorted Thomas J. 9 
h h b h  I&, HC, 
B.273189. 
Interlocutory Concern proceeding 
matters - seven day used to avoid bank- 
adjournment. ruptcy and stigma (p 2). 
21. Re Guest, ex parte 
BhZ Finance Lid [I 9901 
3 NZLR 700, Holland J. 
Declined Chairman to decide Public interest - 
if proposal consider behaviour of 
accepted (p 705). insolvenf s k  of debts 
Re Cbard not of opposing creditors 
followed. Required (p 712). 
percentages absent. 
22. Re v, Approved Review of the Greater recovery than 
mported, Grieg J, 10 history and bankruptcy; no 
May 1990, HC, procedure for misconduct; opposing 
B.2320/89. proposals (p 2). creditor seeking 
vengeance (p 13). 
23. Taylor v National 
Ahhial Finance, 
unreported, Fisher J, 8 
June 1990, HC, 
B. 127189. 
Stay granted to 
suspend 
adjudication 
pending proposal. 
24. Taylor v National 
Ahhial Finance. 
unreported, ~ i s k r  J, 28 
June 1990, HC, 
B.127189. (Further to 
case 23 above.) 
Declined No p v i s i d  Should not need to 
trustee's report (p 9). ferret around papers to 
ascertain proposal 0, 
9). Desire speed and 
finality (p 12). 
Proposal lacked clarity 
(P 13). 
25. Re Burrows, Both Appearance of shaking 
unreported, Willimon Approved off but not paying debts 
J, 29 June 1990, HC, aiticised - approve 
B.IW90, B.101190. with caution ( p 5 ) .  
26. Re Gates, ex parte Adjournment to 
Nebulite Almniwn, formalise proposal 
unreoorted Master (1) n. 
w d h n s ,  k? August 
1990, HC, B.71190. 
27. Re Adamr-Shneidq Declined Dispute over the value 
ex parte M Ltd, of debts immaterial as 
umprted, Master over 42 percent oppose 
W~lliatns, 24 September delay to make a 
1990, HC, B.17W. Prn@ 0, 10). 
28. Guest v DL@ [I9911 Declined Crucial time to Required majority not 
I NZLR 183 (CA), determine votes is achieved for either 
R i c h a r k  Casey, when votes are applicant (p 189). 
Hardie Boys, JJ. (Appeal called for and 
fiom case 21 above.) taken (p 187). 
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Case Name w ' ~nwmess~ ~ d c s l  issug m t ~ h  
(Further to case 28 
Declined W~th the lengthy delay, 
quantum of debt, 
desirability of finality 
and public interest, 
petitioning &tor to 
~roceed (P 482). 
30. Re Guart, ex pule 
BNZ Finance Ltd, [I9911 
1 NZLR 250 0, 
case 29 abbve.) 
Declined Practice and Court must comider 
procedural issues whether the course 
discussed. taken is conducive of 
or detrimental to 
commercial morality 
and the interests of the 
general public (p 254). 
31. Re hhr! [I9911 2 Declined Court ought to Onus on opposing 
NZLR 219, Smellie J. apprwe a poposal creditor (s 143(3)(a) 
unless one of the and @) but for the 
mms for &a1 in court's independent 
s 143(3) exists (p judgment whether it is 
224). expedient in the public 
interest for (c) (p 225). 
Proposal kid 
unrealistically high 
dividend, default 
almost inevitable, 
vague, unable to 
determine when the 
insolvent was in 
default (p 229. 
32. Re W e b r i d g e ,  Adjourned for L i l y  to succeed with 
m p o ~  ripping J, 16 o p e  for llew a mxe precise 
November 1990, HC, @ (P 2). proposal (P 2). 
B.55189. 
33. Re Davies, Declined Proposal used as Proposal significantly 
unreported, Thomas J, 19 means to avoid a d i k n t  to that 
November 1990, HC, bankruptcy order approved by creditors 
B273m. (Further to case 
20 above.) 0, 8). (P 7). 
34. Re PHLatndes, Approved Minor change to Five year repayment 
unqotted, w l i e  J, 10 wording permitted plan, employer cont- 
December 1990, HC, (P 18). ributing, not to be 
B. 1879/90. judged solely on size of 
liabilities (p 14). 
35. Re M b m l d .  Both 
unqorted, Tippkg J, 1 Approved 
March 1991, HC, 
B.223190 & B.561190. 
Not required to alter 
proposal to include 
contribution fiom 
e m  (p 9. 
36. Re Fanner [1991] 4 
PRNZ 628 (HC), 
Tompkins J. 
Application for Cannot take account of 
directions: Proof of proof of debt 1 voting 
debts and trustees letter after meeting has 
duties discussed. concluded (p 638). 
m d ,  h k e r  J, 
w 1991, =, 
B.2161/90. (Not the 
Approved Deliberate and 
10 in.lprudent failure 
to advertise not 
fatal (p 14); 
same insolvh as in case member of legal 
34 above.) profession not 
pmitted special 
Inivacy (P 18). 
R e l m l m t h r m  
banlauptcy (five to six 
cents as to nil), 
employment as 
solicitor f 
permitted some 
personal incentive in 
p r o d .  No need to 
stigrratise behaviour 
(pp 13-15). 
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38. Re Fletchec ex pavte Declined Seeking Debt outstanding for 
Commercial Holdings adjournment to some time, bankruptcy 
Ltd, unreported, Master offer proposal, proceedings served, 
Hansen, 23 May 199 1, last ditch attempt to 
HC, B 2346190. avoid reality (p 2). 
39. Re T m  apmte Granted time to 
G i s h  Disaict Law prepare a proposal - 
Society, unreported, not receiving particular 
Anderson J, 23 May leniency as a solicitor 
1991, HC, B 1/91. @ 4). 
40. Rijnbende v BNZ Bclined Would not grant delay 
Finance, unreported, to present proposal, no 
Master Hansen, 27 June response to requests 
1991, HC, B.2287190 for details (p 2). 
4 1. Re Luey, ex parte Declined Arrangement Provision for 
Defiance Flow Mills lacked legal insolvent's allowance 
Ltd, unreported, Ellis J, precision but need serious defect and 
12 August 1991, HC, not be fatal. To renders inexpedient to 
B.608190. remove provision approve (p 4). W111 not 
for insolvent's refuse approval solely 
allowance is 'of due to family members 
substance' (p 6) supporting votes (p 5). 
42. Re Craig, Both Section 145 could No realistic alternative 
m p o r t e d  Ellis J, 19 Approved be used if security to agreeing to the 
September 1991, HC, for creditor proposal (p 4) Secured 
B 17/91, B.18191. unavailable (p 5). creditor to claim 
security 
notwithstanding s 144 
43. Re Farmer, Both Creditors were Provisions of Act not 
unreported, Hillyer J, 1 Declined entitled to complied with, and 
October 199 1, HC, notification of insolvents' offer not as 
B 812190, B 813190 meeting (p 16) good as could be (p 
(Further to case 36 19). 
above.) 
44 Re ~ l s o n ,  Approved Technical issues Dividend more than 
unreported, Grieg J, 15 immaterial (p 7). under bankruptcy; 
October 1991, HC, maintaining 
B.345191. employment important 
Sharemarket crash was 
the cause; conduct not 
requiring stigma of 
bankruptcy (p 8). 
45. Re Inglis, unreported, Approved Creditor may prove Modification to a 36 
Neazor J, 24 October debt afier meeting month period at 
1991, HC, B.265191 (P 3). creditors' meeting 
approved by the court 
(P 4). 
46 Fmmer v Rowley Both R e M  to approve In determining if 
[I9921 2 NZLR 195 Approved must be related to reasonable, the court 
(CA), Richardson, particular paragraph exercises idqxmdent 
Hardle Boys, McKay JJ. in s 143(3) (p 199). judgemnt but must be 
(Appeal from case 43 Court should not intluenced by the 
above.) reactivate acceptance commercial judgment of 
process and it is creditors w h  approved 
not the court's the proposal and should 
function to promote normally give effect to 
enhancement of a their wishes (pp 200, 
Part XV proposal 202,205). No public 
(P 203) interest cornideratiom to 
weigh agdinst proposal 
(pp 201,208). 
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Case Name Succgsful tJmwus& Technicalissues ~ t O b s e f v a ~  
47. Re White- ex 
parte UDC Finance, 
unreported, Barker J, 9 
April 1992, HC, 
B. 1030191, B.304192. 
Declined Subsidiaries need not Creditors may receive 
be assumed to vote nothin& further 
in order to preserve investigation of debtor 
their parents' under bankruptcy is 
interests (p 12). possible (p 13). 
48. Re Taylor ex parte h e  month given Opposing creditors 
G r e e d ,  unreported, for opportunity to urged to accept 
Thomas J, 9 June 1992, file proposal (p 3). proposal in lieu of 
HC, 9.511192 bankruptcy (P 3). 
49. Re de Bourn, Approved Advertising not a Direction for 
unreported, Grieg J, 22 *WIY advertising and 
July 1992, HC, requirement (p 3). ai3idavit from trustee 
9 163191, given as part of 
approval (p 4). 
50. Re .St&, Approved No advertising of Arose &om one bad 
unreported, Robertson J, meeting (p 3) invedment opportunity, 
27 July 1992, HC, all creditors identified, 
B. 1175192. the bad investment did 
llOt arise h insolvenrs 
occupation, bankruptcy 
would seriously affect 
work (pp 3-4). 
51. Whiteman v UDC 
Finance Ltd [I9921 3 
NZLR 684 (CA), Cooke 
P, Hardie Boys and 
McKay JJ. (Appeal from 
case 47 above.) 
Declined No requirement for Original assessment of 
class voting, no scheme in High Court 
h u d  or mistake to not wrong 0,689). 
taint vote (p 691). Court may determine if 
majority obtained, but 
if it determines it has 
not been, the matter is 
ended (p 691). 
52. Re Whitenran, ex 
jxute UDC Finance, 
unreported, 
Hamen, 13 August 1992, 
HC, 9.304192. (Further 
to case 51 above.) 
Declined Application for linther 
adjournment to 
consider Court of 
Appeal decision 
refwd (p 2). 
53. Re Williams; Approved Details from Courttobecarell 
unreported, W~lliamson meeting determined before rejecting the 
J, 25 August 1992, HC, to be adequate (p 5). commercial judgment 
B.24192. of majority of 
creditors. Investigation 
under badmptcy not 
required (p 6). 
54. Re Taylor (1992) 4 Adjourned bank- Bankruptcy sought in 
NZBLC 102,875, mptcy proceedings vindictive manner and 
Thomas J. (Further to - stay (p 102,879) would realise nothing. 
case 48 above.) Proposal not before Proposing a seven year 
court. five cent repayment 
(pp 102, 877-8) 
56. Re Rwell, ex pwte Declined Declined application 
h t i c  Building Squlies for stay of the 
u, unreported, bankruptcy in order 
W~lliams J, 17 to Prepare a 
September 1992, HC, prop04 (P 4). 
B. 1207192. 
57. Re Mbyle, ex parte Declined Position advised to - Failed to get the 
Tanner Sawnills Ldd, creditors at meeting majority by number: 
unreported, Thorp J, 22 subsZsadially differart both 50 percent for and 
September 1992, HC, to that disclosed against so approval 
B.721192. but not fatal (p 5). was not possible (p 6). 
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Case Name ~ f u l  IJlmwmm Technicalissues ~ t O b s e m t i o 1 1 9  I 
58. Re Evans, Declined Two proposals were 
unreported, Blanchard J, 
26 November 1992, HC, required (P 3). (Re Falconer approach 
B.2143192. endorsed). 
59. Re Coll, unreported, 
Wallace J, 2 December 
1992, HC, B. 1738/92. 
Approved @narpinp o& 
creates a charge 
mder s 2 Insolvency 
Act (p 5). Position 
of secured creditors 
in need of clarity in 
Act (p 9). Farmer v 
Rowley followed. 
60. Tucker v Brown, 
unremrted Holland J. 
Declined 
Almost certain use of s 
50 to restrain opposing 
justifies approval (p 7). 
Full disclosure given, 
not in public interest to 
impose stigma of bank- 
ruptcy. No recklessness 
by insolvent or delay 
contemplated (p 12). 
Proposal suggested but 
subsequently debtor 
filed her o m  bank- 
ruptcy petition (p 2). 
61. Re West, unreported, Approved 
Penlington J, 23 April 
1993, HC, B.5193. 
T m h i c a l  emrs Oppsing creditor could 
corrected under s not show why not 
143(6) @ 8). expedient to approve 
the proposal (p 7). 
62. Re Chambers, 
unreported, Blanchard J, 
20 May 1993, HC, 
B. 122292. (Further to 
case 55 above.) 
Public notice in 
pi~~~IlOtasuMtute 
for actual notice (p 
8). Strict timetable 
to be observed to 
produce a final 
proposal (within 
eight days) and 
then consider 
voting issue (p 15). 
Overlooking a sub- 
stantial creditor's claim 
indicated a less than 
conscientious attitude 
(p 7). Followed the 
approach in Re Hart. 
?he amount to be 
retained was not 
unattainable, and the 
insolvent had faced up 
to his obligations @ 12). 
No omparable benefit 
ffom banlauptcy @ 13). 
63. Re Renneq ex parte 
N a t i d  Bank ofNZ, 
unreported, Master 
Kennedy-Granf 21 May 
1993, HC, B. 127192. 
Annulment of Opportunity to present 
bankruptcy order proposal given that the 
granted - court was formalities were met, 
misled in error (p 6). and it was reasonable 
and calculated for the 
gemal benefit of 
creditors (p9.  
64. Re Mtchell, exparte 
Bunting, unreported, 
Master Kennedy-Grant, 
15 September 1993, HC, 
B. 1203193. 
Declined L i k e l i i  of pmenting 
a proposal illusory and 
support fiom creditors 
unlikely (p 9). 
65. Brown v B N Z  [I9941 Original 
2 NZLR 612, Master Proposal 
Towle. Remained 
Creditor not required Proposal approved for 
by s I44 to get prim M Brown on 4 Dec. 
approval before 1992. MIX Brown had 
pursuing MIX Brow assisted Mr Brown in 
as she was not the meeting his obligations; 
insolvent (p 614). it would not be just 
and equitable to bank- 
rupt MIX B m  (p 615). 
66. Re Websteq Expert to Proposal to be Expert accountant 
unreported, Barker J, 3 Review varied under s 145 required to investigate 
March 1994, HC, Affairs (p4). financial position and 
B.1824191. P r e p  asset 
valuations @ 5). 
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1. Technical issues and obtaining creditor acceptance 
Case Name 
67. Re Spencer (1994) 
16 NZ;TC 11,140, 
McGechan, J. 
68. Re OlzA unreported, 
W~lliamson J, 29 June 
1994, HC, B. 11/94. 
69. Re Whiteman, 
unreported, Tornkins J, 
29 August 1994, HC, 
B.304192. (Further to 
case 52 above.) 
70. Re Fo* 
unreported, Master 
Gambrill, 19 September 
1994, HC, B.64194. 
71. A h o n  v DB 
Brewries Ltd, 
unreported, Eichelbaum 
CT, 9 Novanber 1994, 
HC, B.21189. 
Review ofjudicial authority on proposals under Part XV indicates that 
a significant number have failed at the first hurdle - the proposal was not 
in the prescribed form with the necessary accompanying statement of affairs 
(s 140(4)). Instances of obtaining an adjournment to formulate a formal 
proposal have enabled debtors to avoid bankruptcy proceedings (although 
this has been a temporary measure as a final attempt to avoid reality in 
some instances). Examples of successful adjournments include Ballin v 
Market Gardeners Ltd, Re Gates, ex parte Nebulite Aluminium, Re 
Hucklebridge, Re Taylor, ex parte Greenwood, Re Chambers, ex parte 
Russell Mc Veagh McKenzie Bartlett and Re Renner, ex parte National 
Bank of NZ. A failure to respond to requests for further details will 
undermine an insolvent's efforts to be granted an adjournment in order to 
receive time to present a proposal; see Rijnbende v BNZ Finance. 
Other proposals have failed to satisfy the various requirements of the 
Insolvency Regulations 1970 and the Insolvency Rules 1970. Examples 
include a failure to present separate proposals for each applicant (Re Chard 
Successful 
Approved 
Variation 
Approved 
I m p o t l a n t ~ t i m  
GST is a claim to be 
paid in priority after 
preferred wages. 
Desirable proposal 
which would be 
approved if power 
existed. Section 143(6) 
cannot cure s 143(4) 
deficiency (p 11,142). 
Same claims made for 
discharge as for the 
proposal but 
unsuccessful (p 6). 
Defect in Act as to what 
happens to a creditor 
who assigns their debt, 
forgoes theii legal rights 
and there is default by 
the insolvent (p 7). 
Breaches for genuine 
reasons, !mstee was 
fully informed, good 
faith shown in effort to 
make paymnts while 
out of work, no 
breaches for I5 mo* 
only 20 percent sought 
cancellation (p 3). 
I l m  
Declined 
Declined 
Technicalissues 
Section 143(4) 
cannot be used if 
priorities for 
payment do not 
accord as for 
~MP~CY (P 
11,142). 
Trustee should not 
also appear as 
counsel for 
insolvent (p 6). 
Early discharge 
sou& citing 
earlier proposal in 
support. 
Absalce of details of 
assets and liabilities 
- non-compliance 
(p 3). Opportunity 
to present a 
proposal (p 11). 
Variation pmitted 
(s 145(l)(d) to lump 
sum payments as a 
result ofthe debtor 
losing his job. DB 
Breweries was 
"unremittingly 
hostile" to the 
dcbtor (p 3). 
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and Re Evans) and accompanying affidavits concerning the insolvent's 
assets and liabilities (Re Shaxon). Recently in Re Fordham," no details of 
assets and liabilities were provided. Such a fundamental error should never 
occur with the substantial body of precedent available to specify the 
prescribed form. The proposal should be clear without placing the onus 
on the court to ascertain its substance by ferreting around the masses of 
detail (Taylor v National Mutual Finance12). Nevertheless, in some 
instances technical issues may be overlooked when the court is in favour 
of approving the proposal, provided it has the legislative power to correct 
the proposal under s 143(6).13 
The role of the provisional trustee has also introduced areas of litigation, 
which partially reflects the lack of clarity in the principal Act. Sections 
141 and 142 are the pertinent sections in this regard. The role of the 
provisional trustee is set out in section 141. Failure to obtain the required 
voting majorities has been a catalyst for numerous cases, with examples 
including: Re Fidow, Re Adams-Schneider, ex parte RJI Ltd, Guest v 
DufJL,14 and Re Moyle, exparte Tanner Sawmills Ltd. 
Advertising of the creditors' meeting is an issue which has been left to 
regulation; it is not a statutory requirement but may be required as part of 
approving the proposal (Re de Boam). Judicial opinion has favoured a 
liberal and lenient approach, where a failure to advertise need not be fatal 
to the success of a proposal if it can be shown that creditors have not been 
disadvantaged (for example, refer to Re Riddiford). A fortiori, a deliberate 
and imprudent failure to advertise was not fatal to approving the proposal 
as in Re MA Lowndes. However, disadvantaging a major creditor will be 
fatal to a proposal (Re Davison). Creditors are entitled to be notified of all 
meetings called by the trustee (Re Farmer15). 
The role of the chairman at the creditors' meeting in determining voting 
eligibility has caused divergence in judicial opinion. Initially the procedure 
laid out by Vautier J in Re Chard was applied, but in Re Guest, exparte 
BNZ Finance,16 Holland J held that the chairman determined voting 
eligibility and whether or not the proposal was accepted by the creditors. 
In Guest v Durn1' voting eligibility determination was held to occur when 
votes were called for and taken. However, in the light of the recent decision 
in Re Inglis, it is difficult to reconcile allowing creditors to prove their 
debt after the meeting with the requirements of s 14 1 (3), and determining 
the required majorities for approval in s 142(3). The court may determine 
if the required majorities have been obtained but if it determines they 
have not been, then that is the end of the issue; Whiteman v UDC Finance 
Ltd. In ascertaining the legal validity of debts, Tompkins J held in Re 
Farmer that there could be no account taken of the proof of debt or voting 
letter after the meeting had concluded. Debts are to be proved in the same 
manner as for bankruptcy (Re Lewin). 
Corporate entities may be assumed to vote in their own interests and 
not to protect their parent companies, according to Barker J in Re Whiteman, 
exparte UDC Finance. On appeal, the Court of Appeal determined that 
1 1  Decision given on 19 September 1994. 
12 Unreported, Fisher J, 28 June 1990, HC, B.127189. 
13 See Re Wilson, unreported, Grieg J, 15 October 1991, HC, B.345191. 
14 See also the subsequent decisions concerning the insolvent Guest. 
IS Unreported, Hillyer J, 1 October 1991, HC, B.812190, B.813190. 
16 [I9901 3 NZLR 700. 
17 [1991]lNZLR183(CA). 
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class voting by creditors is not required by the Act, and only instances of 
fraud and mistake may call into question whether the votes may be 
accepted. Family members or close associates, whose votes may be 
essential to gaining the required majorities in support of the proposal from 
the creditors, will not of itself lead to the court refusing to approve the 
proposal (see for example Re Trott and Re Joy, Re Luey, exparte Defiance 
Flour Mills Ltd). The position of secured creditors in the proposal process 
is in desperate need of clarity, in the view of Wallace J in Re Coll. 
The trustee, upon completion of the creditors meeting, must file a report 
to the court setting out, inter alia, the determinations of the meeting and 
whether the proposal was accepted; failure to do so will cause the proposal 
to fail (Taylor v National Mutual Finance18). As noted in Re OlzfS, the 
trustee should remain independent and the trustee's appearance as counsel 
for the insolvent was disapproved of by the court. 
2. The approach of the Courts to granting approval of proposals 
Once the technical formalities of the scheme are satisfied and creditor 
approval has been obtained, the debtor frequently encounters the onerous 
task of persuading the court that approval should not be refused under 
section 143. To satisfy s 143(3)(a) requires the insolvent and the trustee to 
comply with the provisions of sections 140 to 142 inclusive. Divergence 
in judicial opinion is highlighted by the approach taken to granting or 
refusing approval of a proposal under sections 143(3)(b) and (c). One 
important area is the public interest factor, whic h received attention in 
the early case of Re Duncan Holdings, Re Bennetts. Furthermore, judicial 
opinion in Re Shaxon favoured that an overall appreciation of the benefits 
for creditors be taken. 
The following factors have been identified as important to the success 
of a proposal under s 143(3)(b): 
(1) No culpable misconduct by the insolvent (Re Trott and Re Joy, Re 
McGarry) . 
(2) Creditors receive more with the proposal than under bankruptcy (Re 
Trott and Re Joy, Re Riddiford, Re McGarry, Re MA Lowndes, Re 
Wilson). 
(3) Creditors will receive payment earlier with the proposal than under 
bankruptcy (Re Trott and Re Joy). 
(4) The nature of insolvent's business suggested no better proposal could 
be expected (Re Riddiford). 
(5) Provision for some entrepreneurial incentive is permitted where this 
is the method by which creditors will be paid and such payment would 
not be possible should the insolvent be made bankrupt (Re Riddiford, 
Re A44 Lowndes). 
(6) Creditors need to firmly resolve what they want and further delays 
would only cause prolonged debate (Re Riddiford). 
(7) The insolvent agrees to contribute more to creditors to a level deemed 
appropriate by the court (Re Ally). 
(8) The opposing creditor is seeking vengeance or acting vindictively 
(Re McGarry, Re Taylor). 
18 Op cit n 12. 
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(9) The repayment period is longer than required under bankruptcy (Re 
PH Lowndes, Re Taylor). 
(10) The employer is contributing to the insolvent's repayments, a factor 
which could not be enforced under bankruptcy (Re PHLowndes). 
(1 1) Maintaining employment as a professional person is fundamental to 
repayment (Re M A  Lowndes, Re Wilson). 
(12) There is no realistic alternative or comparable benefit to approving 
the proposal (Re Craig, Re Chambers). 
(13) If the commercial judgment of creditors is in favour of the proposal, 
the court should normally give effect to this (Farmer v Rowley, Re 
Williams). 
(14) The livelihood of the insolvent is unrelated to the cause of the 
insolvency, with bankruptcy likely to impinge on the insolvent's 
occupation (Re Stoddart). 
(1 5) An investigation under bankruptcy is not required (Re Williams). 
(16) The amount retained by the insolvent from his earnings is reasonable 
(Re Chambers). 
Factors which have contributed to the failure of a proposal to satisfy s 
143(3)(b) include: 
(1) The recovery and the proposal itself do not contain any substance 
(Re Nathan, Re Davison). 
(2) The proposal is not reasonable or for the benefit of creditors (Re 
Henry, exparte Diners Club (NZ) Ltd). 
(3) The level of debt is astronomical by New Zealand standards (Re 
Henry, but compare this finding to the earlier decision in Re Trott 
and Re Joy). 
(4) There is an unrealistically high dividend (Re Hart). 
(5) Default by the insolvent is almost inevitable (Re Hart). 
(6) The proposal is vague and the court is unable to determine when the 
insolvent would be in default (Re Hart). 
(7) The proposal before the court is significantly different to that agreed 
to by the creditors (Re DaviesIg). 
(8) An investigation of the insolvent is desirable, which requires 
bankruptcy (Re Whiteman, exparte UDC Finance). 
If the proposal survives scrutiny under s 143(3)(b), it may still fail to 
receive approval if, in the opinion of the court, it is not expedient (suitable 
or advisable) that the proposal should be approved. The following factors 
and comments have been identified as important to determining the 
expediency of approving a proposal under s 143(3)(c): 
(1) The public interest is relevant to determining expediency (Re Duncan 
Holdings and Re Bennetts, Re Fidow, Re Davison, Farmer v Rowley). 
(2) A need for finality, emphasised by a deteriorating financial position, 
will not assist expediency (Re Fidow). 
19 Unreported, Thomas J, 19 November 1990, HC, B.273189. 
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(3) Ifthere is no misconduct by the insolvent, determination of expediency 
is assisted (Re Kelliher, Re Guest, exparte BNZ Finance, Re Coll). 
(4) The public is entitled to protection and perceptions created by allowing 
a person to continue to operate without bankruptcy cannot be ignored; 
there should be a deterrence aspect (Re Nathan). 
(5) A failure to advertise needs evidence to support a finding that it 
remains appropriate to approve the proposal (Re Riddiford). 
(6) Overall justice is a component of determining expediency (Re 
Davison). 
(7) The size of the debts of the opposing creditors (Re Guest, ex parte 
BNZ Finance). 
(8) Will approval be conducive or detrimental to commercial morality 
and the interests of the general public (Re Guest, ex parte BNZ 
Finance)? 
(9) If there is a need to stigmatise the behaviour with bankruptcy, the 
proposal will not be approved (Re A44 Lowndes, Re Wilson, Re Coll). 
(10) An excessive allowance for the debtor will render a proposal 
inexpedient to approve (Re Luey, ex parte Defiance Flour Mills Ltd). 
(1 1) The opposing creditor needs to convince the court of reasons why it 
is not expedient to approve the proposal (Re West). 
The decision of Penlington J in Re West is difficult to reconcile to the 
approach taken by Smellie J in Re Hart, where in the latter case Smellie J 
stated that the court would exercise its own judgment as to whether it is 
expedient to approve the proposal in the public interest. From a close 
examination of the judgments in the cases, it has been rare for a proposal to 
fail solely by virtue of the court determining it to be inexpedient to grant 
approval. There have been no instances in the analysis of refusal solely on 
grounds of public interest considerations under s 143(3)(c), although a 
significant number of decisions have endorsed inclusion of the public interest 
in determining expediency. Other deficiencies in the proposals before the 
court have enabled the court to avoid refusing approval solely for reasons of 
the public interest, preferring the parties to enter bankruptcy proceedings. 
3. Requirement for priority of repayments in accordance with 
bankruptcy procedures 
Section 143(4) clearly provides that the proposal must set out the priority 
of repayment in accordance with the procedure for distribution of the assets 
of a bankrupt (s 104). In essence, the priorities with proposals will need to 
incorporate: 
(1) Amounts due to secured cred itors; 
(2) The trustee's reasonable expenses and fees; 
(3) Arrears of wages and salaries to the legislated maximums; 
(4) Payments to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (which includes 
income tax, FBT and GST); 
(5) Wages and salaries not due as a preferred claim, followed by the 
spouse's wage or salary; 
(6) Any interest on debts as provided for in agreements between the 
insolvent and the creditors; and 
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(7) A rateable amount for remaining debts of unsecured creditors not 
repaid as above. 
Inclusion of the priority for the trustee's fees and expenses is crucial.20 
GST clearly became a payment in priority in District Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue v Bain, (confirmed in the recent case of Re Spencer). The 
position of secured creditors is unclear and should be included in a review 
of the Act, according to Wallace J in Re Coll. 
4. Correction to proposals of an incidental nature 
Section 143(6) permits the court to make corrections to a proposal 
which are not of substance. In Re Duncan Holdings and Re Bennetts, 
removal of the name of Duncan Holdings Ltd from the list of creditors as a 
consequence of the company moving into liquidation was not of substance, 
in the view of Hardie Boys J. As a result of the sale of a property reducing 
the amount of interest payable by the insolvent, the court accepted an 
amendment to the proposal in Re Nicholson of a reduction from $500 to 
$3 50 per week gross for the maximum period of 17 weeks that the insolvent 
would be required to meet this payment. In Re Alty, the insolvent was 
directed by the court to contribute a further $5,864.55 representing 
superannuation scheme contributions and the amended proposal was 
approved utilising s 143(6). In Re PHLowndes, removal of the words "the 
difference between" was considered to potentially be an amendment of 
substance but Wylie J held that the words were a nonsense as they stood. 
Amendment to the "windfall" provision of the proposal was not permitted 
as this would be an amendment of substance. Dicta in this decision highlights 
the fine balance between corrections of a minor nature and those of substance. 
The imprecise details of how the insolvent would be permitted to retain 
an allowance was a matter of substance and therefore could not be altered 
in Re Luey, exparte Dejiance Flour Mills Ltd. Typographical errors may 
be corrected under s 143(6) where such errors are a~c identa l .~~  If there are 
errors with respect to priorities as required by s 143(4), then these cannot 
be cured by s 143(6) in the view of McGechan J in Re Spencer. According 
to His Honour, section 143(4) takes precedence over section 143(6) in the 
statutory scheme of Part XV; a finding in need of further appraisal with 
the next review of the Insolvency Act. 
5. Effect of court approval of a proposal 
Minimal case law has developed in this area. One example is Re Craig, 
where Ellis J proposed that once the proposal was approved, the secured 
creditor could claim its security notwithstanding the provisions of section 
144. In Brown v BNZ, Master Towle determined that since the insolvent's 
spouse was not a party to the insolvent's scheme and had not made any 
proposal as an insolvent under section 139, then the BNZ did not require 
court approval under s 144(l)(b)(ii) to commence legal proceedings against 
the insolvent's spouse. Master Towle held that the word 'debt' in s 
144(l)(b)(ii) is to be taken as meaning the 'debt due by the insolvent' in 
order to provide a sensible interpretation to the provision; a justifiable 
conclusion in the context of the statutory scheme. 
20 See Re Taylor, unreported, Sinclair J, 11 April 1985, HC, B.136184. 
21 Re West, unreported, PenlinGon J, 23 April 1993, HC, B.5193. 
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6. Cancellation or variation of a proposal 
When an insolvent fails to maintain his or her obligations under the 
proposal, an application for variation or cancellation ofthe proposal under 
section 145 may be made to the court. In Re Richards, ex parte Bell, the 
insolvent ceased to be employed and make payments as stipulated in the 
proposal approved two years earlier. The proposal was cancelled approx- 
imately one week after the judgment was delivered by Hardie Boys J.22 In 
Re Craig, Ellis J was prepared to allow an application for a variation under 
s 145 if a secured creditor was unable to prosecute its claim for security. 
In Re Webster, Barker J ordered a variation of the proposal in the light 
of evidence that the insolvent was involved in employment in a manner 
different to that envisaged in the proposal, that the creditors were not 
informed of this change, the unavailability of tax losses from one of the 
insolvent's companies, and the insolvent's failure to make proper disclosure 
of his accounts and financial situation. Payments from income were to 
continue, but an expert investigating accountant was to be appointed to 
ascertain the financial situation and accuracy of valuations of assets, and 
the size and nature of the contingent liabilities. 
In the recent decision ofAdamson v DB Breweries Ltd, Eichelbaum CJ 
determined that the proposal was to be varied under s 145(l)(d) to allow 
the insolvent to make lump sum payments in settlement (a decision in the 
insolvent's favour). This followed evidence that the insolvent's breach 
was significant, but it was a result of losing his job (a genuine reason for 
breach). The insolvent had kept the trustee fully informed, showed good 
faith in making an effort to make payments when out of work and there 
were no breaches for the past 15 months while the proposal was fully 
operational. Furthermore DB Breweries had shown an "unremittingly 
hostile" attitude towards the insolvent, and cancellation rather than variation 
was only favoured by 20 percent of the creditors (of which DB Breweries 
represented two-thirds). 
7. Proposals and concepts of justice 
The cases analysed vividly illustrate the results of investment decisions 
turning sour following the worldwide sharemarket crash and decline in 
commercial property values. Failures of businesses also feature 
prominently. However, the contention that proposals are made by 
insolvents with substantial debts arising from speculative investments and 
spectacular financial failures, and which have been accepted by creditors, 
rather than a facility which is available and likely to succeed for the 
insolvent with a relatively small deficiency of funds, receives substantial 
support from the cases reviewed over the period 1980 to 1994. 
Specific examples of proposals which were subsequently approved by 
the courts include Re Trott and Re Joy, Re Riddiford, Re PHLowndes, Re 
A44 Lowndes, Re Wilson, Re Stoddart, Re Williams, and Re Coll. In these 
cases, the size of the outstanding debt was large, in the tens of millions in 
Re Trott and Re Joy, yet creditor acceptance and court approval was given. 
The largest recorded level of debts of over $55 million occurred in Re 
Henry, exparte Diner Club (NZ) Ltd, but the court determined the proposal 
22 Judgment was delivered by Hardie Boys J on 23 December 1980 with cancellation ofthe proposal 
effective from 1 January 1981. 
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failed under s 143(3)(b). Exercise of the court's discretion under s 143(3)(c) 
to refuse approval on grounds of expediency and relating the refusal to the 
size of debts has been discussed but has not proved exclusively decisive 
or pivotal to any decision. 
Another important observation is the crucial support of family and 
closely-related or "friendly" creditors for gaining the necessary creditor 
majorities. Examples of this phenomenon include Re Trott and Re Joy, 
where acceptance from the Caxton group of companies was vital to the 
success of the proposals. Barker J in Re Whiteman, exparte UDC Finance 
Ltd indicated that subsidiary companies need not be assumed to vote in 
favour of preserving their parents' interests. On appeal, the Court of Appeal 
affirmed the decision of Barker J that the statutory scheme does not provide 
for a requirement of class voting and that votes should effectively only be 
considered tainted when there is a suggestion of fraud or mistake. There 
was no evidence to suggest that the votes were tainted.23 
VI. HAVE PROPOSALS BEEN A SUCCESSFUL ALTERNATIVE TO BANKRUPTCY? 
The success of proposals as an alternative to bankruptcy can statistically 
be viewed in the following manner for the 71 judgments analysed (58 
separate cases involving a final decision of the court): 
Table 3: Successes and Failures of Proposals under Part XV: 1980 to 1994 
The above analysis indicates that when the final decision of each ofthe 
cases is considered, a future application for court approval of a proposal 
or variation to an existing proposal, has statistically the same chance of 
meeting with success as with failure. Furthermore, placing a greater weight 
on the more recent decisions, the number of proposals failing to receive 
approval is significant and does not suggest that a decline in unsuccessful 
applications for approval is imminent, in spite of the burgeoning judicial 
dicta on proposals under the Insolvency Act. 
category 
All cases (71) 
0;jtcluding 
adjournments) 
seFarate osg (58) 
(Excluding 
adjournments) 
23 Support of the family and closely related companies was vital to the recent annulment on 28 
February 1995 of the bankruptcy of Alan Bond in Australia when an arrangement (equivalent to 
a Part XV proposal) was made for $A3 million on approximately $A600 million of debt. Payment 
of less than 0.5 percent has enabled Mr Bond to maintain his "life of luxury" through the 
assistance of family trusts, reputed to be worth over $A55 million. What is clear in this case is 
that proposals can enable an insolvent to carry on as if nothing has happened without any public 
examination of the events leading to the insolvency, and the power that large closely related 
creditors can have over smaller creditors in forcing acceptance of the proposal within the 
legislative framework's requirements. 
Approved 
(Number) (%tage) 
Adjournment 
(Number) (Ohtape) 
25 
25 
26 
26 
Declined 
(Number) ( O h g e )  
134 
8 
35.2 
43.1 
44.8 
52.0 
33 
33 
24 
24 
18.3 
13.8 
46.5 
56.9 
41.4 
48.0 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS A D OBSERVATIONS 
The case history indicates a flurry of activity concerning proposals 
following the advent of the 1987 worldwide sharemarket crash. It also 
reveals a startling number of unsuccessful applications as a result of 
technical deficiencies in proposals, deficiencies which the insolvent (and 
their counsel) should have ensured were addressed prior to taking the 
proposal to the court for approval. Perhaps this high failure rate is a 
consequence of failing to take legal advice before presenting a proposal to 
creditors. Jurisprudential guidance has evolved with the influx of proposals, 
with earlier decisions frequently devoid of useful discussion on the reasons 
why the proposal was approved or not approved. Procedurally, proposals 
are susceptible to the problems associated with bankruptcy proceedings, 
although there are differences in the statutory scheme which significantly 
influences the style of interpretation. 
Debate over the interests of the public in Part XV proposals has caused 
an apparent change in judicial focus following the analysis by Heath. The 
Court of Appeal decision in Farmer v Rowley refocusses attention to the 
creditors' judgment on the proposal. In response to Heath's concluding 
statement, there has not been an instance during the period of analysis of 
a proposal solely failing in response to the court promoting the public 
interest under s 143(3)(c). 
Bankruptcy proceedings involve the debtor, creditors and the public as 
three major players in resolving the bankrupt's affairs. This theme is not 
expressed with any degree of clarity with respect to proposals; an issue 
that may require careful thought with a review of the legislation. Clearer 
legislative statements on the purpose of proposals (by way of a purpose 
section), reference to the priorities that apply to proposals, and regulation 
guidance on the procedure for creditors' meetings and ascertaining votes 
are vital. The scope of the term "expedient" in s 143(3)(c), the extent of 
corrections which are permissible under s 143(6), and simpler expression 
of the requirements of section 144 should also be placed prominently on 
the list of items for review when the Insolvency Act receives a revamp to 
reflect the conditions of the 1990s. 
One restriction on reviewing the case law has been the unreliability of 
the databases to provide comprehensive reference to all instances of proposals 
before the courts in the period 1980 to 1994. An excellent example of this 
deficiency in case notes on the databases concerns the proposals filed in Re 
Webster and in Adamson v DB Breweries. With both cases, the first reference 
to the earlier proposals (which were approved by the court), appeared in the 
subsequent applications for variation and cancellation under section 145. 
The results of this study provide a comprehensive review and some 
insight into proposals that have come before the New Zealand courts in 
the fifteen year period 1980 to 1994. This should assist future proposal 
applicants, and provide some evidence of the effectiveness of the 
legislation. The intentions of the Legislature appear to have been met in 
most instances; insolvent persons have been able to avoid bankruptcy where 
this is of benefit to the debtor and the creditors, and frequently this has 
been in the public interest in the view of the judiciary. A purpose section, 
and a reorganisation and rewriting programme in similar vein to the process 
underway on the Income Tax Act in New Zealand and the Tax Law 
Improvement Project in Australia, (albeit on a lesser scale), are posited as 
fundamental to the workability of the Insolvency Act twenty five years on 
from its last reorganisation and consolidation. 
